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A NOVEL ABOUT THE CIA'S MERCENARIES COMPANY MAN BY JOE MAGGIO

STATINTL

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Not since Robin Moore's *The Green Beret* has such a powerful novel about modern warfare appeared—a book so shocking that it promises to generate excitement, alarm and controversy. Startling in its authenticity, *COMPANY MAN* is the painfully vivid story of a CIA mercenary—an insider's account of intrigues that are all too often borne out by sensational news breaks.

In this brutal novel, Joe Maggio exposes the shadow world of the CIA ("the Company") and the mercenaries paid to die for their country. The story centers on Nick Martin, contract employee of the CIA's Special Operating Division (SOD), who finds himself stranded in the Congolese jungle. Used and abandoned by the Company, he now believes that he has been set up for an ambush.

An arm of the Company that runs virtually unregulated, the SOD employs outcasts, criminals, and ex-military men in the "world defense against Communism." Once a Green Beret and later a graduate of the Farm—the SOD's "secret" training base in Langley, Virginia—Martin had already been dispatched to

(Continued on back flap)

CHE GUEVARA'S SECRET AFRICAN WAR

by Colin McGlashan

He was his adopted country's Minister of Industry, and a roving ambassador for revolution, but he was no statesman; for one thing, he could never hide what was on his mind. Addressing the U.N. General Assembly, he mixed a new anger with the familiar cold analysis of colonial-

Faded newsreel film: almost the only evidence of Che Guevara's secret visit to the Congo in 1965

ism. "Western civilisation," he told them, "disguises under its showy front a scene of hyenas and jackals. That is the only name that can be applied to those who have gone to fulfil 'humanitarian' tasks in the Congo. Bloodthirsty butchers who feed on helpless people . . . The free men of the world must be prepared to avenge the crime committed in the Congo." Three weeks later, on January 2, 1965, as Cubans celebrated the sixth anniversary of their revolution, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara was in Brazzaville planning his second war: the battle for the Congo.

The stakes were high. Like Bolivia, the Congo was the key to a continent: its borders touched nine nations. Victory would throw a socialist girdle around Africa. The rebels against Moise Tshombe's central government had lost Stanleyville in November to Belgian paras and mercenaries in U.S. planes, but still controlled most of the northern half of the country, an area twice the size of France. The big powers were quietly moving in for what looked like the start of an African Vietnam: the Congolese Air Force acquired some elderly fighter-trainers and B-26s from the U.S., with the CIA's Cuban exiles, veterans of the Bay of Pigs, to fly them, plus helicopters and 14 huge C-130 transports with American crews. Russian and Chinese arms

ville, in Ilyushin transports from Algeria, in trucks through the Sudan. At Heliopolis, outside Cairo, 3000 Congolese trained under Algerian instructors; others trickled home from Havana and Peking.

Guevara toured the diplomatic and physical boundaries of the growing struggle: Ghana, Guinea, Algeria, Peking; and met rebel leader Gaston Soumaliot in Dar es Salaam for a tour of bases and supply lines around Lake Tanganyika. On March 15 Fidel Castro embraced Guevara at José Martí Airport in Havana; but the exact date on which he joined the struggle in the Congo is unknown; he may have spent several months as a strategist, away from the conflict. In February on, Tshombe's men met a few determined resistance in the north-east; on February 9 a column of 600 Congolese troops of 100 mercenaries repeatedly ambushed with heavy casualties by rebels with bazookas who came up close and stood their ground. A week later 750 government troops were chased out of a small town. For the first time, roads were mined, and Tshombe's River Congo supply lines thrown into chaos by the sabotage of marker buoys. Armoured cars fell into pits that had let lighter traffic pass over them, a classic trick from Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare*. But the struggle in the north-east was waning: supply lines were being closed, Nasser was losing interest.


In June, Guevara secretly joined Soumaliot's rebels in their last stand in some of Africa's most savage and inaccessible country just to the west of Lake Tanganyika.

The rebels had plenty of arms, but Congolese army gunboats, with U.S. advisers, were harassing supply lines across the lake; Colonel Mike Hoare was moving north with a strong new force of mercenaries. No account of what happened has been published, although Tshombe's forces found a Cuban's diary, and the Foreign Ministry in Havana is said to have two rolls of film that Guevara took at the time. The official biographies mention the Congo struggle. At the

start, some determined ambushes carried the signature of the *Sierra Maestra*, but by September it was as good as over. Nasser, almost certainly following CIA pressure, stopped arms shipments to the rebels. Guevara probably returned to Havana in November to tell Castro Cuban support should be withdrawn.

What went wrong? Ciro Roberto Bustos, the Argentinian captured with Régis Debray, was later to tell the Bolivians that Guevara had said of the Congo rebellion: "The human element failed. There was no will to fight. The leaders were corrupt." The way the rebels treated prisoners disgusted him: the butchers were not all on the other side. In a last message - read to the Tricontinental conference in Havana in April 1967 - he wrote: "There are no great popular upheavals. In the Congo these characteristics appeared briefly . . . but they have been losing strength." The Congo rebels had controlled half the country; for guerrilla theory and its leading practitioner it was a little-known but disastrous defeat.

Colin McGlashan, who has visited Cuba, has written articles on guerrilla warfare.




STATINTL

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THE SELLING OF



Text by Morton Kondracke

Photography by Dennis Brack & Fred Ward

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A Short History of CIA Intervention in Sixteen Foreign Countries

In July, 1947, Congress passed one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the history of America in peacetime. The National Security Act of 1947 created The National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Air Force and, not least of all, the CIA. This act provided the Agency with five principal duties:

1. To advise the National Security Council on matters concerning intelligence.
2. To make recommendations for the coordination of such intelligence matters.
3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and disseminate it to other government departments.
4. To perform "such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."
5. To perform "such other functions and duties as the NSC would direct."

In 1949 Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency Act, allowing the agency to disregard laws that required disclosure of information concerning the organization, to expend funds without regard to laws and regulations governing expenditures with no other accounting than the Director's vouchers, and to make contracts and purchases without advertising.

With such unprecedented authority, with unlimited access to money, with liberty to act without regard to scrutiny or review by either civilian or governmental organizations, the CIA has become a self-contained state. One observer ranks the CIA as the fourth world power, after the U.S., Russia, and China.

Partly because of the CIA's special "secret" status and partly because of the laziness of the press, the total history of CIA intervention in foreign countries has never been reported. What you read instead are fragments—an attempted bribe in Mexico last July, an assassination in Africa last November.

What emerges here is an atlas of intrigue but not a grand design; on the contrary, the CIA's record is as erratic and contradictory as that of any bureaucracy in the Federal stable. But you do begin to comprehend the enormous size of the CIA and its ruthless behavior. The rules permit murder, defoliation and drug addiction for political ends. Look at the record:



WASHINGTON POST
26 NOV 1971

A Novel of 'Cowboy Diplomacy' in the Congo in the '60s

Reviewed by
Bruce Oudes

Books

STATINTL

The reviewer has written extensively on African affairs and was a member of the American mission to the Congo (Kinshasa) in 1964-65.

In this process of adding up our flesh and blood as well as psychological losses from our recent adventures abroad, there should be a line for the foreign service, especially the junior ranks. Talented potential candidates have shunned government service, and a number of those on the inside have resigned outright. An entire foreign service generation has been depleted by this self-purge.

Some signed petitions and demonstrated before they quit; others made a splash of resignation as a question of principle. Malcolm McConnell did neither.

He quietly went to a Greek Island and wrote in eloquent fury a taut first novel about how a young American diplomat and ex-Freedom Rider, Steve Sherman, and his sexually athletic wife spent the last week of 1965 in the Congo during a *matata*, the Swahili equivalent of brouhaha.

And what, pray tell, does this now ancient Congolese history have to do with, say, the U.S. "people-to-people" campaign in Indochina? As Sherman, the disenchanted FSO, put it to a CIA man on New Year's eve in Albertville, "All you people going around the world writing surrender passes and bombing the hell out of people and stuff like that. It's O.K. as long you say they're Communists . . . Why the hell do we always have to decide who gets bombed and who gets the milk powder?"

Sherman is disgusted not

MATATA. By Malcolm McConnell.

(Viking, 360 pp., \$8.95)

only with the superficiality of the U.S. contact with the Congolese, but with the vapid, play-every-night life he and Lisa are leading within the American community—a phenomenon known as embassy incest.

One of the paranoia-inducing truths of embassy life abroad is that in posts without an FBI agent, it is the CIA section that keeps tabs on the private lives of all Americans. McConnell demonstrates just what a clout for conformity this lever can deliver. The spook tells Sherman, "You won't get a security clearance for a pay toilet in Red Square when I'm through with you."

"Matata" is the first novel to give a slice of what life was really like for Americans in the Congo in those slapdash days, and McConnell's effort is a vivid, chilling success. The Congo, now the Republic of Zaïre, was the kind of place where one set of American officials used every possible pressure to keep private Americans from joining the South African-Rhodesian dominated mercenary commandos, while others saw to the "merces" combat needs including jeeps—with AID friendship decals—to chase Simba rebels. It wouldn't do for Americans to actually kill Africans, not even errant ones.

McConnell, fortunately, does not limit his perspective to a one-way view of the Congo's tragedies, but he tells at sympathetic counterpoint the only slightly incredible story of the quintessential Congolese, Pierre-Marie Tshimpama, a victim of independence.

One is almost relieved to see Tshimpama's youthful respect and admiration for whites evolve to adult hatred. Anything less would have meant McConnell pulled punches. A CIA B-26 I saw parked on the apron at Kamina in 1964 carried an unforgettable reminder.

On the nose of that plane: "our" anti-Castro Cubans were flying on behalf of the Congo's national air force was the World War II-style hand-painted name: "Boogie's Bogey."

The difficulty of drawing a fair conclusion about what the U.S. did in the Congo is that, according to the usual yardsticks of international success, our cowboy diplomacy worked. The Congo is still whole, the U.S. role and expenditure there is down considerably, American influence remains high, and the government is relatively stable. Joseph Mobutu is just as much a fat-cat general and expert at one-man elections as Nguyen Van Thieu, but he and his country have receded in the American mind back to the travel pages.

Nevertheless, the American diplomatic brigade that helped put out the fire is to a substantial degree still intact. When things got slow in the Congo, the State Department transferred McConnell's boss, Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley, back to Indochina. The gregarious Godley took to Laos a choice selection of aides including his CIA station chief and his present chief deputy where, to this day, the "Congo mafia" is still doing business.

However, the protagonist man, had no difficulty

reaching a conclusion about the quality of American diplomacy he saw. He told the CIA man tall about it: "You're all just robots. You don't have any human feeling left . . . They're just spies or niggers or slopes to you. They're something to f— around with, something to laugh at and plan air strikes against and make up lies about in your horseshit reports. It doesn't matter where they send you. It'll always be the same, doesn't matter if it's Cuba or Laos or the Congo. You just follow orders."

The civil rights collegians of the early '60s didn't integrate easily into the foreign service. They weren't as indifferent and calculating as the traditional mold would have preferred, but the Steve Shermans were intensely aware of what Washington is now rediscovering: the human consequences of foreign policy.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Ex-CIA Man Tells Secret War Effort

By Jack Anderson

A former insider has charged that the Central Intelligence Agency has provided the President with the military wherewithal to wage his own private wars around the world and is geared to fight still new clandestine wars.

In a confidential memo to Rep. Herman Badillo (D-N.Y.) former CIA official Victor Marchetti makes these allegations:

• The White House has used "vague phraseology" in the law to build up a vast military arsenal and paramilitary force. Past presidents have ordered the CIA to wage secret wars in Asia, Africa and Latin America without the traditional constitutional safeguards and congressional oversight.

• The CIA "has bought and sold air transport companies all over the world" from the Congo to Nepal, so the President could mount paramilitary operations almost anywhere. Marchetti claims one such company, Air America, "has grown so large, owning more aircraft than most major U.S. airlines, that it was a source

of embarrassment within the agency. A senior officer had to be assigned the full-time job of keeping an eye on George Dole (the founder) in the hope of cooling his fantastic business success in the Far East."

• Southern Air Transport, a Miami-based firm, is also fingered by Marchetti as a CIA subsidiary. "The sole purpose for the existence of SAT," he asserts, "is that the CIA be ready for the contingency that some day it will have to ferry men and material to some Latin American country to wage a clandestine war."

Fire Fighters

Marchetti also identifies Rocky Mountain Air of Phoenix as "one of the more colorful companies owned by the CIA." This outfit specializes, he says, "in training and air-lifting parachutists, ostensibly for fire fighting purposes." But he then points out that the CIA has no need of fire fighting capability "unless it is to put out military brushfires south of the border."

• The CIA's "air capabilities, its warehouses full of unmarked military supplies in the Midwest, a secret demolition training base in North

Carolina, even a secret airbase in Nevada, and its connections with international arms dealing firms," Marchetti charges, give the President a formidable, secret war-making capability.

A CIA spokesman acknowledged that Marchetti formerly held a position of trust at CIA headquarters. He resigned several months ago to write a novel, "The Rope Dancer," based on his CIA experiences. But he abandoned fiction recently to write a detailed background memo for Congressman Badillo, who has introduced legislation to restrict the CIA to intelligence gathering and to prohibit clandestine wars.

Declarse Marchetti: "Airports and huge supply bases were secretly established up-country, close to the action. Arms and material were delivered by the boatload from the CIA's warehouses in the Far East and the United States."

"Guerrilla chieftains were recruited to lead the Meos, who would actually fight the war for the CIA. The government of Laos was placated and finessed into turning things over to the CIA opera-

tors who could conduct the conflict.

Swashbuckling Agents

"The chief of station—the CIA's top post in the field—during the crucial mid-60s, was His previous assignment had been Berlin, where he announced to the CIA contingent there upon his arrival that he intended to tear down that blankety-blank wall. He was transferred to Laos before he had the opportunity to carry out his threat, in part because of his ferociousness."

"He has been succeeded by, former chief of station in the Belgian Congo. When things grew quiet there, he once dropped everything for a clandestine foray into the French Congo in hope of tracking down Che Guevara."

"He failed. But his fellow operators a couple of years later eventually caught up with the revolutionary in Bolivia."

"These are the kind of men who have led the CIA in Laos, and the CIA has led the U.S. into another humiliating, inextricable international dilemma."

Bell-McClure Syndicate

STATINTL

Nixon's super-secret memorandum criticising CIA

STATINTL

New York, Monday

Newsweek magazine said yesterday President Nixon had written a super-secret memorandum sharply criticising the U.S. intelligence network for a series of five recent failures.

The latest issue of the magazine said the real reasons for Mr. Nixon's re-organisation of U.S. intelligence activities spelled out in meticulous detail in the top-secret document.

Newsweek said the president's discrepancies on how the U.S. could detect possible Soviet violations of any arms control agreement. Newsweek also described how the Central Intelligence Agency planned and carried out the overthrow of Antoine Gizenga's Congolese government.

Mr. Nixon, the report said, singled out five main failures:

— Failure to predict the ferocity of Liberation Army resistance to the Laotian campaign earlier this year;

— Misinformation that led to an elaborately-planned commando raid on an empty prisoner of war camp at Son Tay (which, says Newsweek, still rankles the White House).

— Incorrect estimates of the number of Liberation Army weapons and supplies flowing through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville;

— Belated discovery of surface-to-air missiles that suddenly sprouted in the Middle East ceasefire zone last year;

— and an eight-month delay in the strategic arms limitation talks while the White House tried to sort out intelligence

At one point, according to the magazine's account, a crate of Kalashnikov rifles meant for the rebels — and disguised as Red Cross packages for refugees — was allowed to drop and break open while being unloaded from a Czechoslovak ship in Khartoum.

Newsweek said a CIA agent later successfully stole from a courier at Khartoum airport a suitcase containing 330,000 U.S. dollars. This had been supplied by the Soviet KGB and was also bound for Gizenga's troops, it said.

Referring to how Mr. Nixon receives his daily intelligence briefing, Newsweek said that early every morning a black

Plymouth car from the CIA delivers a stiff, grey, legal-sized folder marked 'President's daily briefing' to the White House.

Only three other copies of the report are delivered — one to Secretary of State William Rogers, one to Defence Secretary Melvin Laird, and one to Attorney-General John Mitchell.

But the President does not bother to read his copy of the top secret report. Instead, he asks his advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to summarise it for him, Newsweek claimed.

The CIA and the clumsy crane

STATINTL

New York, November 15

The weekly magazine "Newsweek" claimed today that the American Central Intelligence Agency had played an important part in bringing about the downfall 10 years ago of Antoine Gizenga's Stanleyville Government in the Congo — now the Zaire Republic.

The CIA's rôle in the affair involved the exposure of Soviet smuggling of arms disguised as Red Cross packages, and the theft of Soviet funds destined to pay Gizenga's army, the magazine said.

The account which "Newsweek" said was previously unpublished, recounted how Gizenga made a bid for leadership of the former Belgian Congo in 1961.

He had attended the Prague Institute for African Affairs and spent six weeks in Russia, and was seen by Washington as "Moscow's new man in the Congo," the magazine said. He broke away from the Congolese Government, which had the backing of the United Nations, set up a regime of his own in Orientale Province, armed 6,000 troops with smuggled Russian guns and paid them with Soviet funds.

The White House authorised covert operations to stop him, and the CIA was informed by friendly European agents that a Czech ship was bound for Port Sudan with a cargo of guns disguised as Red Cross packages for the relief of refugees in the Congo.

"Newsweek" went on: "A direct appeal to the port authorities to inspect the crates would never work, the CIA's man in Khartoum realised. The Sudanese would have to be faced with public exposure of the contraband.

"Appropriate arrangements were made on the wharfs before the Czech ship docked. 'If my memory serves me right,' a former CIA man says, 'It was the second crane load. The clumsy winch operator let

the crates drop and the dockside was suddenly covered with new Soviet Kalashnikov rifles.'"

On the incident involving the soldiers' pay, "Newsweek" recalled that by late in 1961 Gizenga's troops were growing restive as their arrears mounted. An appeal was made to Moscow, and Soviet intelligence delivered \$1 million in US currency to Gizenga's delegation in Cairo.

The CIA learned that one third of the money was to be delivered by a courier who would take a commercial flight to Khartoum, wait in the transit lounge to avoid a Customs search, and then take another plane to the Congolese border.

"When the Congolese courier arrived in Khartoum and settled into the transit lounge, his suitcase between his knees, he was startled to hear himself being paged and ordered to proceed immediately to the Customs area," the magazine went on.

"After a moment of flustered indecision, he took the bag over to a courier and left it unobtrusively near some lockers before leaving for Customs. At that point a CIA man sauntered out of the men's room, picked up the suitcase, and headed out the back door where two cars were waiting with motors running."

"Newsweek" concluded: "Not long afterward, Gizenga's Government fell. It was said that his troops suffered from shortages of arms and were upset because they hadn't been paid." — Reuter.

SEPTEMBER 1971

Dossier on the

CIA

by William R. Carson

For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times policy-making arm of the government. I never thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. --ex-President Harry S. Truman.

NOTHING has happened since that pronouncement by the agency's creator in December 1963 to remove or reduce the cause for concern over the CIA's development. As currently organized, supervised, structured and led, it may be that the CIA has outlived its usefulness. Conceivably, its very existence causes the President and the National Security Council to rely too much on clandestine operations. Possibly its reputation, regardless of the facts, is now so bad that as a foreign policy instrument the agency has become counter-productive. Unfortunately the issue of its efficiency, as measured by its performance in preventing past intelligence failures and consequent foreign policy fiascos, is always avoided on grounds of "secrecy". So American taxpayers provide upwards of \$750,000,000 a year for the CIA without knowing how the money is spent or to what extent the CIA fulfils or exceeds its authorized intelligence functions.

The gathering of intelligence is a necessary and legitimate activity in time of peace as well as in war. But it does raise a very real problem of the proper place and control of agents who are required, or authorized on their own recognizance, to commit acts of espionage. In a democracy it also poses the dilemma of secret activities and the values of a free society. Secrecy is obviously essential for espionage but it can be -- and has been -- perverted to hide intelligence activities even from those with the constitutional responsibility to sanction them. A common rationalization is the phrase "If the Ambassador/Secretary/President doesn't know he won't have to lie to cover up." The prolonged birth of the CIA was marked by a reluctance on the part of politicians and others to face these difficulties, and the agency as it came to exist still bears the marks of this indecision.

What we need to do is to examine how the U.S. gathers its intelligence, and consider how effective its instruments are and what room there is for improvement. Every government agency has its secrets. The CIA's Director, acknowledged before the American Society

of Newspaper Editors, should be supervised by the Intelligence Agency. The time is long overdue for a supervisory role for the Central Intelligence Agency in the Cold War. Under this CIA administration of inquiry by the President and specifically requiring disclosure of titles, salaries, and expenses of the CIA; (ii) expectations on expenses of the Director's family without advance notice to the Government; and the Government's responsibility for staff abroad and their families. 1949 Central Intelligence Director a lie.

With so much is seen by many as a stine coups, in Guatemala Mossadegh in the Cuban I failure). The President Kei 28, 1961, w heralded -- y Because the agency's "m...

representative of the unending gambitry and bigger than life human aspect of espionage and secret operations. At this level the stakes are lower and the "struggle" frequently takes bizarre and even ludicrous twists. For, as Alexander Foote noted in his *Handbook for Spies*, the average agent's "real difficulties are concerned with the practice of his trade. The setting up of his transmitters, the obtaining of funds, and the arrangement of his rendezvous. The irritating administrative details occupy a disproportionate portion of his waking life."

As an example of the administrative hazards, one day in 1960 a technical administrative employee of the CIA stationed at its quasi-secret headquarters in Japan flew to Singapore to conduct a reliability test of a local recruit. On arrival he checked into one of Singapore's older hotels to receive the would-be spy and his CIA recruiter. Contact was made. The recruit was instructed in what a lie detector test does and was wired up, and the technician plugged the machine into the room's electrical outlet. Thereupon it blew out all the hotel's lights. The ensuing confusion and darkness did not cover a getaway by the trio. They were discovered, arrested, and jailed as American spies.

By itself the incident sounds like a sequence from an old Peters Sellers movie, however, its consequences were not nearly so funny. In performing this routine mission the CIA set off a two-stage international incident between England and the United States, caused the Secretary of State to write a letter of apology to a foreign chief of state, made the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore look like the proverbial cuckold, the final outcome being a situation wherein the United States Government lied in public -- and was caught.

ENVOY GODLEY

War Full-Time Job for Our Man in Laos

BY ARTHUR J. DOMMIEN
Times Staff Writer

VIENTIANE—The U.S. ambassador to Laos is George McMurtrie Godley, genial New Yorker, Yale '39, member of the Brook Club, perhaps Manhattan's most exclusive. He personally directs one of the most private wars being fought on the globe today.

It takes so much of his time and energy that his fellow diplomats in the Laotian capital complain they rarely see him. The president of the Laotian National Assembly, Phoui Sananikone, complains that Godley never once has invited him to his house for dinner in the 18 months he has been here. His diplomatic relations are almost exclusively with neutralist Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma, a frequent tennis partner.

Godley's war effort is directed from his air-conditioned, windowless first-floor office in the embassy here against as many as two North Vietnamese divisions in the north. The real enemy is Hanoi—what the Pathet Lao do or say counts for nothing — and his motivation is bluntly stated:

"I don't like to see the United States get beaten."

Impressive Array of Power

To prevent that, Godley has a most impressive array of physical power and personal discretion, so much so that Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) once remarked he was acting as chief of staff and "perhaps it would be better to call him Proconsul Godley."

Aside from the usual appendages of American missions overseas, such as the U.S. Information Service, the Agency for International Development and the Central Intelligence Agency, Godley inherited a staff of 234 military attaches, the nerve center of the American military effort in Laos, both on the ground and in the air.

The AID mission serves as cover for some CIA operations, and also for another branch of the American establishment known as the Requirements Office, which supplies the royal Laotian army and air force with all its fuel, bombs and ammunition as well as spare parts for its fleet of 45-odd T-28 prop-driven fighter-bombers.

Approval of Bombings

But the major part of the American effort consists of bombing by American planes, mostly from Thailand but also from South Vietnam and the 7th Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin. Godley found himself with the function of approving all bombing strikes on Laos. He did this himself or else delegated the approval to a subordinate who became known as the Bombing Officer. It could be anyone in the embassy; most recently it was a consular officer. The point is that the ambassador has the right to overrule—and reportedly sometimes does—the generals and admirals.

So absorbed is Godley, 53, in running the war—there is a huge map of Laos on his office wall, along with a photo of the home in Cooperstown, N.Y., to which he intends to retire—that diplomatic colleagues complain he has little time for other activity.

Godley periodically visits bases like that of the CIA at Long Cheng, and to remote dirt airstrips where he confers at first hand with his attaches on the ground, and AID personnel keeping track of refugee movements and requesting supplies to be flown in by the U.S.-chartered airline, Air America.

And during last year's unsuccessful Communist siege of Long Cheng, the ambassador was reported to have aimed an artillery piece himself.

A major duty of the large staff of attaches—which numbered only one in the 1950s—is to keep track of where friendly forces are operating, and this, plus intelligence gathered largely by American reconnaissance planes, determines the bombing targets.

All this machinery was developed by Godley's predecessor, Ambassador

William H. Sullivan, who by all accounts established the pattern of what the functions of the U.S. envoy to Laos would be.

Sullivan came to Laos at the end of 1964 and remained until 1969, four and one-half years of critical importance to the United States during which the Vietnam war was escalating rapidly and already spilling over into Laos.

Deeply Committed

By the end of 1964, the U.S. was already deeply committed to the support of Souvanna Phouma's government and was providing him substantial aid, including financing a back-up fund to maintain the value of Laotian currency. Souvanna Phouma had already signified his agreement to air strikes by American planes against North Vietnamese positions in Laos, a verbal understanding that was to remain the sole basis for such strikes up to the present.

The relationship between the prime minister and the American ambassador grew out of this situation of Laos' involuntary involvement in the Vietnam war. The ambassador was given virtually a free hand insofar as the application of military force was concerned, but this had to be applied within a framework of official American support for the neutrality of Laos, without forcing cancellation of the neutralization agreement that had been worked out at Geneva in 1962. The American ambassador thus became the man, more than the prime minister, who decided in effect how much strain the neutrality of Laos could stand.

Godley, arriving in Vientiane to take up his post as ambassador in July, 1969, was ideally suited to replace Sullivan.

His Navy service in 1939-41 had given him a grasp of what the needs of military staffs are, and his subsequent service at the

American Embassy in Bern during the World War II years had familiarized him with undercover operations.

Later Service

More importantly, Godley's later service in the Congo, where he was deputy chief of mission and eventually ambassador, had shown him what small numbers of men using old but well-adapted weapons could do in an underdeveloped country.

A friend who knew Godley in the Congo in the years 1964-67 says he had at his disposal a fleet of U.S. Air Force C-130 transports. These were used to carry a tiny force of mercenary troops onto the airfield at Stanleyville on Nov. 24, 1964, to crush the leftist revolts flaring in the eastern Congo. Cuban T-28 pilots hired by the CIA also played a vital role at a time when American policy had swung around from earlier opposition to mercenaries in Katanga to regard them as the most effective means of holding the country together when the Congolese national army proved ineffective. Godley was running that show on the spot, too, an experience that helped mold his expressed opinions about Laos.

Godley, fairly tall and husky of build, usually wears slacks and a loose-fitting jacket, left open, and puffs on a cigar while on his aerial inspection excursions. He also is occasionally seen on Vientiane outings sporting a bush jacket from the African days with portraits of Moise Tshombe and Joseph Mobutu on the front and back, respectively.

While born in New York City, Godley's family is rooted in Otsego County in upstate New York. Godley is divorced from his first wife and while in the Congo in 1966 married Stearns'

THE CONGO

There are two ways of looking at the Congo. The first is to compare it with the past, and marvel. Once in turmoil, fractured, tearing apart, projecting images of brutality and savagery, the Congo these days is a reasonably calm, quiet, secure, and united country of 20 million people. A visitor can go almost anywhere without fear. The authority of President Joseph Désiré Mobutu reaches almost everywhere. Considering the Congo's history, these are remarkable achievements.

The second way of looking at the Congo is to put aside the past, take the Congo for what it is today, and despair. The Congo is exhibiting some of the worst traits of independent black Africa—corruption, waste, elitism, luxury, grandiosity, and neglect. The government can build what the Congolese call the world's second-largest swimming pool, but it refused, for more than a year, to pay the bills to transport to the Eastern Congo U.S. relief food for children afflicted with kwashiorkor, the disease of advanced malnutrition. The public treasury spends millions of dollars for monuments and parades but no money to build a road from the farms of Kivu Province to their port on the Congo River. At a time when other African leaders, like President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, are trying to infuse their people with self-reliance, austerity, and honesty, Mobutu is rushing the Congo the other way.

Those who sympathize with Mobutu, including American officials, plead that an outsider must not let his second way of looking at the Congo obscure the first. They insist that waste is a small price to pay for security and that the Congo, with its history of disunity and humiliation, and its lack of confidence, may need circuses and monuments more than other countries. This argument is hard to dismiss or even discount, but it is based on some questionable assumptions.

Blood

For much of its early history, the Congo, as large as the Mississippi, was almost ungovernable. Tranquillity lasted only

a week after the independence celebrations of June 30, 1960. Troops of the Congolese Army mutinied against their Belgian officers and massacred whites and others at will. This set off an exodus of Belgian technicians, managers, farmers, and businessmen and brought on a series of bloody secessions and rebellions.

In 1961, the Congo had four governments—two rival central governments in Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville) and Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville), and two secessionist governments in the states of Kasai and Katanga. In mid-1964, leftist rebels who called themselves Simbas (Swahili for "lions") controlled two fifths of the Congo and held a thousand whites hostage.

The struggle for unity was long and arduous. United Nations troops put down the longest and most important secession—that of Moïse Tshombe's Katanga—in 1963. By the end of 1964, the central government, ironically headed for a period by Tshombe, crushed the Simba rebellion with the help of Belgian paratroopers, American planes, CIA pilots, and white mercenaries. In November, 1965, General Mobutu, commander of the Army, took over the government in a coup. He faced a challenge in 1967 when a bizarre mutiny by white mercenaries sent the Eastern Congo into turmoil again. But the mercenaries were pushed out of the country.

Today the Congo is relatively stable and united, and Mobutu claims full credit for it. Of course, order is relative in the Congo. Despite all its boasting about stability, the government still faces a pocket of rebellion in the south of Kivu Province on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. To those who remember how much of the Congo's past turmoil can be traced to the indiscipline and brutality of the Army, reports from South Kivu are discouraging.

"A single chief"

There is one great contrast with the past: life in the rest of the Congo goes on these days as if the rebels did not exist. A visitor hardly hears about the Kivu rebellion elsewhere. Mobutu is tough and authoritarian, and this marks another contrast with the past. Mobutu is a young man, so nervous about seizing power in the Congo that, according

to close friends, the act almost broke him. He gave up power in five months.

Today, Mobutu, wearing his leopard-skin cap and brandishing a baroque cane, exudes confidence and authority. Once an almost inaudible, frightened speaker, he now addresses adulating crowds of thousands for hours, his voice hysterical, strident, yearning, cajoling, firm. There is a sureness in his measured walk and a dignity in his bearing. His authority was demonstrated last November in the Congo's sham presidential election. The final tally showed 10,131,669 votes for Mobutu and 157 against him.

The main source of Mobutu's power is his six battalions of Israeli-trained paratroop commandos, including the one helping the Army deal with the rebels in South Kivu. The battalions are mobile units of 900 men each, ready to be airlifted to any part of the country should a rebellion or mutiny break out. But, not content with this, Mobutu is also trying to follow the lead of other African rulers and turn himself into a personal symbol of national unity. To some outsiders, in fact, there seems to be a touch of megalomania in him. His is a one-man show, with almost no tolerance for opposition. In one way or another, he has gotten rid of almost all the young, educated politicians who surrounded and advised him in 1965.

Mobutu's rule has been ruthless. His security forces dealt with a demonstration by students of Lovanium University in 1969 by killing more than forty of them. Former Prime Minister Evariste Kimba and three other former ministers were executed early in his reign. In 1969, rebel leader Pierre Mulele was enticed back to the Congo on a promise of amnesty and then executed by a firing squad. Mobutu's style includes rewriting history to make him more of a national hero. Mobutu has invoked the name of Lumumba as the great martyr of the Congo and painted himself as the natural heir of Lumumba. These efforts overlook the fact that Mobutu was the man who first arrested Lumumba and who joined other Congo-

America's Foreign Policy: Its Success Can Breed Failure

STANLEY MEISLER

KINSHASA, Congo

The biggest problem about American policy in the Congo is its success.

This huge black African country is one of the few places in the third world where U.S. policymakers set down their basic goals and achieved them in a few years with little fuss and criticism.

When the Congo fell apart in chaos after independence in 1960, the U.S. government decided to do what it could to make the Congo united, stable, secure and free of communism. The alternative seemed to be continuous turmoil in Africa.

Ten years later, the Congo is relatively united, stable and secure and definitely free of communism. Moreover, it also is receptive and appealing to American investment.

But while the Congo can boast of all these things, it also has some less prideful traits. Its stability and unity have been fashioned by an authoritarian regime that displays

Times staff writer Meisler is based in Nairobi.

some of the worst excesses of Africa: corruption, greed, luxury, waste, elitism, grandiosity, neglect.

In the long run, these traits could undo much of the past success. Unity and stability in Africa are always fragile.

But success in American foreign policy seems to be such a rare and dazzling phenomenon these days that it has blinded U.S. officials from seeing the Congo as it really is. They are too optimistic, too smug, too vague about what is going on.

The United States has more influence on the Congo than any other outside power. This influence stems from involvement and generous assistance.

The Kennedy administration decided to make the Congo a test of its African policy. The United States would show Africa that it supported the integrity of the new independent states and would help them withstand the pressures trying to splinter them. This was most important in the Congo—the geographic and strategic heart of Africa. Division and chaos there might bring on communism.

Since then, the United States has spent more money on the Congo than on any other country in black Africa. The U.S. Embassy says total foreign assistance since independence has come to more than \$600 million. This includes military assistance and the American share (42%) of the \$402 million U.N. military operation that ended the secession of Katanga in 1963. It does not include the cost of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, which was blatantly active in the first years of independence.

After the United Nations put down Katanga, the United States became more direct in its support of the Congo. When a leftist rebellion succeeded in taking over two-fifths of the Congo in 1964, the United States acquiesced in the Congo's hiring of white mercenaries, supplied them with food and equipment, flew them in American transport planes, and provided B-26 bombers to support their attack.

*

The bombers were flown by CIA-hired Cuban pilots and maintained by CIA-hired ground crews. American transport planes dropped Belgian paratroopers on Stanleyville (now Kisangani) that year in the attack that rescued white hostages and broke the back of the rebellion.

In 1967, when the mercenaries under Col. Jean Schramme mutinied, the U.S. government braved criticism in the U.S. Senate to send three C-130 transport planes to help Pres-

ident Joseph Mobutu put down the mutiny.

In the last few years, the United States has diminished its economic and military assistance programs. That stems in part from reduced congressional appropriations. But there also is less need now. The Congo is relatively calm and united. A sharp rise in copper prices has given the Congo a budget surplus and a large reserve of foreign exchange.

The new American emphasis is on private investment. Until now, total U.S. investments have come to only \$25 million to \$30 million. The United States wants more to come in. American officials are actively selling the Congo to American businessmen. In August, President Nixon told the visiting Mobutu that his advice to American business leaders "very simply would be this: The Congo is a good investment."

American officials believe that the American commitment to the Congo has paid off. The Congo no longer hits the headlines as the symbol of chaos and savagery in Africa. Mobutu, long a favorite of American officials, feels close to the United States. As he put it at a news conference in Washington, "I believe that our relations with the United States are quite special."

This special relationship, however, brings up a disturbing question. If the United States can take credit for much of the stability in the Congo, must it also take the blame for at least some of the excesses? Does the foreign aid that once subsidized stability in the Congo now subsidize its wasteful, luxury projects?

Take the matter of roads. Almost all outsiders agree that the first economic priority of the Congo these days is road construction and maintenance. Agriculture in the Congo is stagnant partly because farmers cannot get their crops to market.

U.S. officials understand this. They have used counterpart funds, generated by U.S. foreign aid, for road maintenance. There are plans for the United States to join the World Bank and the European Common Market in a massive road building project that could cost more than \$100 million.

But a visitor must wonder whether American road building simply will allow the Congolese government to divert more of its funds to prestige projects like the world's second largest swimming pool, a monument to the late Patrice Lumumba and a giant football stadium. Because of copper, Congolese govern-

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Behavior of Army Key to Congo Future

BY STANLEY MEISLER
Times Staff Writer

KINSHASA, Congo --

The soldiers of the Congolese army--once only a rabble--are still hoisterous, uneducated, ubiquitous. But they are sometimes polite these days and, their bayonets are back in the barracks.

You feel less like crossing the street to avoid them.

How deep is the change? The question is difficult to answer. Many outsiders here believe that President Joseph D. Mobutu has instilled much discipline in the army. Others detect a disturbing tendency for the soldiers to revert to their old ways when the pressure is on.

Terrible Past

But the question, though difficult, is vital. The future stability of the Congo depends a great deal on the stability of the army. Much of the Congo's terrible past can be traced to the behavior of its soldiers. The troubles began, in fact, when the soldiers mutinied against their Belgian officers in the first week of independence in 1960. This set off a succession of secessions, rebellions, and mutinies that kept the Congo in turmoil for much of its early history.

A good deal of the destruction in the Congo came from the army's reaction to events. Often unable to cope with rebels, it took out its humiliation on unarmed civilians, both black and white. Returning to towns after rebels had left, the army would destroy and loot and kill in the Belgian, who train a frenzy.

After Belgian paratroopers and white mercenaries had cleared Stanleyville (now Kisangani) of soldiers of the rebel Simbas in 1964, the Congolese army marched in and slaughtered 2,000 civilians. When the mercenaries rebelled in 1967, Congolese soldiers killed numerous white civilians in a fit of vengeance. After the mercenaries left Bukavu, the Congolese army took back the town and looted and killed at will.

Colonial Days

With foreign assistance, Mobutu, who had commanded the army until he took over the government in a coup in 1965, has tried to reorganize the army, which had no African officers in Belgian colonial days. To those who believe he has done well, 1967 is the turning point. In that year, the Congolese, with some outside help, drove the white mercenaries out of the Congo. The victory eased some of the old humiliation and gave the soldiers new confidence.

The army, which now has 45,000 to 50,000 men, is expected to grow even more, making it the second largest army in Africa. Only the Nigerians, with an army bloated during their civil war, would have more.

The army's elite are six mobile units, each with 900 paratroop commandos trained by the Israelis. Mobutu wants them ready to intervene anywhere in the country if a rebellion or mutiny breaks out. To help move them, he has just bought three new C-130 transport planes from the United States for \$17 million. His air force also includes two DC-4s, a dozen DC-3s, 15 Italian Macchi jets, six Alouette helicopters, and 16 small trainer planes.

Besides the Israelis, foreign advisers include the Belgians, who train the regular army, Italians,

who train the pilots, and Americans, who train soldiers in communications and logistics. The Belgians have the most influence, with 300 advisers in the army. The American military mission comprises 38 men.

Since independence, the United States has given the Congo about \$25 million in direct military aid, second in Africa only to that granted Ethiopia. This figure, however, does not include the cost of the U.N. military force, largely financed by the United States, that put down the secession of Katanga in 1963. Nor does it include the cost of assistance by the Central Intelligence Agency in putting down the rebellion of the Simbas in 1964 and of the C-130 transport planes sent to the Congo to help transport soldiers in 1964 and in the mercenary uprising of 1967.

Most foreign military observers say that the new Congolese army has not really been tested and that it is too early to tell how the soldiers would react in another crisis. The little evidence available, however, is somewhat discouraging.

The Congo still contains a pocket of rebellion in the south of Kivu province on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. The rebels there evidently control some gold mines which provide enough income to buy arms.

Often Drunk

Observers who have toured the troubled area say that the paratroop commandos look well disciplined and effective in action. The regular soldiers, however, look as bad as ever. According to observers, they are often drunk and undisciplined. They live off the local population, and there are numerous stories of looting, rape, and murder.

Moreover, the observers

overreact and kill innocent villagers in retaliation for rebel attacks.

In what also may be an overreaction, the Congolese army has ordered its Belgian pilots to strafe fishing boats on Lake Tanganyika at night on the assumption they are transporting Chinese arms from Tanzania. This, and Mobutu's decision to buy patrol boats to police the lake, may cause the Congo some difficulty with the Tanzania government later.

Both in Kivu and elsewhere, the American advisers in logistics have been frustrated by the army's continual failure to ship spare parts from Kinshasa to the troops in the field. The delays have been so great, in fact, that some outsiders suspected Mobutu simply did not want his units outside Kinshasa to become too mobile and powerful. This theory, however, has been largely discounted of late, and most outsiders now blame normal Congolese inefficiency.

In Kinshasa, the army also showed brutality in its handling of a demonstration by students of Louvain University in 1969. The soldiers opened fire and killed between 40 and 50 students.

The army also may have played a disquieting role in the execution of Pierre Mulele in 1968. Mulele, a rebel leader, was enticed back to the Congo with an offer of amnesty. A week after Mulele's return, Mobutu announced that he had been tried and shot by a firing squad. The affair subjected Mobutu to international ridicule and condemnation.

According to one theory, Mulele actually had been killed by vengeful Congolese soldiers. Mobutu decided to accept responsibility rather than challenge and discipline his soldiers.

If true--and it is a big if--the theory raises questions about the army at that time, a hold vital for Congolese stability.

Rebellions in Africa Fail to Achieve Goals

BY STANLEY MEISLER
Times Staff Writer

NAIROBI—Seven countries in independent black Africa have faced organized insurrections in the last decade, an unenviable record, matched nowhere else. Most of the troubles stem from tensions between religions and tribes.

In no case has an insurrection succeeded in overthrowing a government or establishing a separate state. Nigeria and the Congo, for example, are now quiet, having put down the bloodiest rebellions of the decade. Kenya and Cameroon, which faced lesser challenges, also are quiet. But insurrections still go on in Ethiopia, Chad and the Sudan.

In addition to all these insurrections in independent Africa, there have been rebellions in colonial Africa — the struggle to overthrow the Portuguese rulers of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. These are racial struggles against white colonialism and differ a good deal from the insurrections north of them.

Report Similarity

In one respect, however, there is a similarity. The rebels in independent Africa also have looked on their battle as a kind of colonial struggle. They have seen the central government as an instrument of a foreign tribe or religion trying to oppress them.

Whether the enemy has been the Portuguese in Lourenco Marques or the Moslems in Khartoum or the Amhara tribe in Addis Ababa, the rebels in both colonial and independent Africa have fought under the banner of self-determination.

What brings on these rebellions? First of all, independent black Africa has had great difficulty trying to weld national unity and fashion tribal identity. Its boundaries make no sense. Its tribes are too different.

Its administration is too weak.

After the treaties partitioning Africa among the European powers in the late 19th century, a British diplomat boasted it was done with "a blue pencil and a ruler."

An incredible number of straight lines were drawn, without regard to geography or, more important, tribe. The boundaries split tribes sometimes and, more often, pushed other tribes that wanted to be left alone into an association with their enemies or oppressors.

Power at Center

Since African countries are not really nations, Africans give their first loyalty to a smaller community—usually the tribe. People think in terms of tribe and act the same way. In Chad, for example, the rebellious tribes of the center and north do not look on President Francois Tombalbaye as a Chadian from the southwest, the way New Yorkers look on President Nixon as an American from California. The alienated tribesmen see Tombalbaye as a hated member of the foreign Sara tribe.

The feeling of alienation and disaffection intensifies in Africa because power at the center is usually not shared by the different tribes. Through easier access to arms or Western education, some tribes tend to dominate the government while the other tribes tend to feel left out.

To make matters worse, the governments often lack the money and skills to administer much or well in the interior, where the alienated tribes usually come from. In some remote areas of Ethiopia and Chad, for example, a vil-

lenger thinks of government only as the tax collector, the primary school teacher and the public health assistant. If a small group of rebels frighten the three out of a village, the government ceases to exist there.

By the standards of Vietnam or the Middle East, these insurrections, with the exception of the Biafran attempt at secession from Nigeria, have been minor affairs. Nevertheless, they have been an enervating drain on the economies of these poor countries.

Nigeria spends 24% of its budget on defense, the Sudan 18%, Cameroon 17%, the Congo 15%, Chad 14% and Ethiopia 13%. This is a costly diversion for countries bent on development.

The failure of the rebels so far in all these insurrections is due mainly to the support Britain, France and the United States have given to most of the central governments.

British arms enabled Nigeria to defeat Biafra. French arms and troops put down the rebellion in Cameroon and are keeping Tombalbaye in power in Chad. American arms and money saved the Congo from a secession and two rebellions and are doing the same in Ethiopia.

This does not mean that without Britain, France and the United States the rebels would all be in power in these countries and the insurrections over. Without outside interference, the Nigerian and Ethiopian insurrections might have ended with a breakup of the countries and peace.

But, in the other cases, the results would probably have been chaos and more insurrections. The rebels would have had just as hard a time governing as those in power now.

Three Are Neighbors

The three countries still trying to put down insurrections are neighbors, though the rebellions do not have any connections with each other:

—Ethiopia — Eritrea, a province in northern Ethiopia, had been an Italian colony since the 19th century. But, after World War II, Italy gave up its African territories and the United Nations ceded Eritrea to Ethiopia as an autonomous province.

But Emperor Haile Selassie, who wanted to create a united national empire under the dominance of the culture of his Amhara tribe, soon broke faith with the United Nations and revoked the autonomy of Eritrea. It became a province like any other, subject to the authoritarian rule of the emperor.

Eight years ago, the Eritrean Liberation Front began its rebellion for independence from the Amharas. Although its guerrillas have probably numbered less than 5,000, the ELF has managed to harass the Ethiopian administration throughout much of the countryside.

At times, the ELF's dominance in the interior of Eritrea is made embarrassingly clear. The rebels recently kidnaped both the American consul in Asmara and a Peace Corps volunteer to show their contempt for the government.

The struggle is religious as well as tribal. The emperor and his Amharas are Coptic Christians, while the ELF gets most of its support from the Moslems in Eritrea. Most of the rebels' arms come from Syria and Iraq and the ELF keeps offices in the capitals of most Arab countries.

The Ethiopian army of 43,000 is armed by the United States and trained by Americans, including troops from the U.S. Special Forces. Since 1951, the United States has given the emperor more than \$125 million worth of military aid. The emperor has assigned about a quarter of his army to root out the rebels but it has failed to do the job so far.

Congo's Mobutu seeks U.S. investment

By Winston Berry
Afro-World Associates

United Nations, N.Y.

President Joseph D. Mobutu of the Congo (Kinshasa) is now on a state visit to the United States. He has come a long way, with important assistance from American official sources, from his sergeant's rank in the Guard Mobile of the Belgian colonial administration, to instant general, with a short wait in the wings before proclaiming himself President of the Republic.

He is now being hailed by Secretary of State William Rogers as a soldier-statesman in the mold of George Washington and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Greeting Mobutu at the White House Aug. 4, President Nixon said the U.S. had made a "good investment" in the Congo because it has become a "strong, vigorous and stable country." The word "stable" was used here to mean that "law and order" has at last prevailed in the Congo.

Mobutu's first step toward "law and order" was to hand the late Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba over to Moïse Tshombe, (during the rebellion against the Congolese government) for execution. He next brought Tshombe, a proven traitor to his country, to the capital as Prime Minister. As head of the army, Mobutu cooperated with white mercenaries from South Africa, Belgium and Rhodesia against his countrymen, who still pursued the ideals of Lumumba. This campaign against the "rebels" led to the bloodbath of November, 1964, in Stanleyville, in which reportedly more than 10,000 Congolese were slaughtered by Belgian paratroops, ferried in American planes from the British-administered island of Ascension, off the West Coast of Africa.

Exploitation and suppression

According to public records, the United States government and private investors have injected \$800 million into the economy of the Congo since it became independent in 1960 under the leadership of Patrice Lumumba. Most of this "investment" has been in the form of military hardware and military and police training. Private investments have gone into companies engaged in exploiting the mineral riches of the country—copper, tin, industrial diamonds, gold, cobalt, zinc and uranium.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency organized the Congolese Air Force in the early 1960's and recruited pilots for it from among Cuban refugees. This enabled Mobutu's army to fight the pro-Lumumba revolutionaries. At about the same time the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) built a police academy and recruited former New York State policeman John F. Manopoli to head a police-training program in Leopoldville.

It was not long after that—in 1966—that four members of the political opposition were arrested. In 1969, the Congolese students demonstrated

against deteriorating social and economic conditions. Mobutu's reply to their demands for more freedom and food was an attack in which more than 60 students were mowed down by army and police gunfire.

While all of this attention was being paid to "law and order," the roads were left in decay and bridges went unrepaired. In 1968 it was impossible for produce from the countryside to be brought to the capital.

"The white man is back"

Moreover, the Belgian plantation owners, who had fled during the turmoil that followed the coming of independence, were invited back. Their terms were that they would have a hand in provincial and national government. Now, in the words of a popular news magazine, "the white man is back" in the Congo and doing business at the same old stand. Luxury foods are being ordered from South Africa along with certain industrial equipment, despite the request by the UN that such trade be eliminated.

One of Mobutu's reasons for coming to the U.S. is to hunt for more American investment and government aid for the Congo. At a press conference in Washington last week he assured U.S. investors "my government has never contemplated tampering with foreign assets or nationalizing foreign companies." Indicating he was "not afraid of what is described as American imperialism," Mobutu said: "What more does capital need than political stability, hard-working people and natural resources?"

So far, aid and investment has only helped the foreign-owned sector of the economy. Prices have risen more than 200% but even salaries in the cities have only been raised 25%. According to United Nations economic reports the per capita income of the Congo amounts to \$60 annually.

AUG 15 1970

UNITED NATIONS REPORT WINSTON BERRY

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The former sergeant is now being hailed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers as a soldier-statesman in the mold of George Washington and Dwight D. Eisenhower, according to the public prints. And in greeting Mobutu at the White House on August 4, President Nixon said the U.S. had made a "good investment" in the Congo because it has become a "strong, vigorous and stable country." The word "stable" was used here to mean that "law and order" has at last prevailed in the Congo.

Mobutu's first step toward the "law and order" Nixon loves so well was to hand the late Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba over to Moïse Tshombe, the in rebellion against the Congolese Government, for execution. He next brought Tshombe, a proven traitor to his country, to the capital as Prime Minister, while he (Mobutu), the head of the army, cooperated with white mercenaries from South Africa, Belgium and Rhodesia against his countrymen who still pursued the ideals of Lumumba. This campaign against the "rebels" led to the bloodbath of November, 1964, in Stanleyville, in which reportedly more than 10,000 Congolese were slaughtered by Belgian paratroops, ferried in American planes from the British-administered island of Assension, off the West Coast of Africa.

According to public records, the United States Government and private investors have injected \$300 million into the economy of the Congo since it became independent in 1960 under the leadership of Patrice Lumumba. But it appears that most of this "investment" has been in the form of military hardware, military training and police training. Private investments, of course, have gone into companies engaged in exploiting the mineral riches of the country--copper, tin, industrial diamonds, gold, cobalt, zinc, and uranium.

Americans of the Central Intelligence Agency organized the Congolese Air Force in the early 1960's and recruited pilots for it from among Cuban refugees. This was to enable Mobutu's army to fight the pro-Lumumba revolutionaries. At about the same time the United States Aid for International Development (AID) programme built a Policy Academy and recruited former New York State Policeman, John F. Manopoli to head a police-training program in Leopoldville.

It was not long after that--in 1966--that four members of the political opposition were arrested and subsequently hanged in public by the Mobutu Government. In 1969, the Congolese students got restless as a result of deteriorating social and economic conditions. Mobutu's reply to their demands for more freedom and more foods was an attack in which more than 60 students were moved down by army and police gunfire. This "no nonsense" way of dealing with student unrest acted out what Vice President Spiro Agnew is able to express only in words. But it was one of the ways in which President Mobutu has brought law and order to his country.

While all of this strenuous at-

tention was being paid to law and order, the roads were left in decay, bridges were unrepaired, it was impossible in 1968 for produce from the countryside to be brought to the capital.

Moreover, the Belgian plantation owners, who had fled during the turmoil that followed the coming of independence, were invited back. Their terms were that they would have a hand in provincial and national government. Now, in the words of a popular news magazine, "the white man is back" in the Congo and doing business at the same old stand. Luxury foods are being ordered from South Africa along with certain industrial equipment, despite the request by the UN that such trade be eliminated.

Prices have risen more than 200 per cent, but even salaries in the cities have only been raised only 25 per cent.

According to United Nations economic reports the per capita national product of the Congo amounts to less than ten dollars annually. But copper production is maintained and the expensive living of the Belgian businessmen is uninterrupted.

President Mobutu is said to be looking for more American investments and more American aid for the Congo. But so far the aid has affected only the betterment of the foreign-owned sector of the economy. And the Congolese ministers are functioning just as the late Frantz Fanon, the author of "The Wretched of the Earth", said they would: as artificial capitalists function-

ing as middlemen between the natural wealth of their country and the money available in Western capitals. This is neo-colonialism in its classic without economic substance.

Imperialism's Fifth Column

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SEVERAL areas in Asia, Africa and Latin America have been the scene of reactionary plots in the first half of 1970. One of them, in Cambodia, culminated in a coup d'état. Information filtering into the press suggests that all the plots can be traced to the US Central Intelligence Agency headquarters at Langley.

Of course, the State Department consistently denies American complicity, and CIA guilt cannot always be pinpointed. In fact, it may well be that not all these conspiracies were directly instigated and organised by imperialist secret services—in some cases they may have joined at a later stage. But this much is certain: everywhere the cloak-and-dagger operators have been at work.

Supporting Israeli aggression

The first three months of 1970 saw plots in Iraq, Sudan, Lebanon and Cyprus. Some of the details have come to light. The Lebanese Interior Minister, for instance, announced that US Intelligence had a hand in provoking armed clashes between the ultra-Right Kataeb party and the Palestinian commandos. The Lebanese army and security forces were involved in the fighting. The Sudanese press points to the link between the CIA and the latest unsuccessful coup of the Ansar religious sect and the Al-Umma party, which speaks for Sudan's capitalist and landed interests. In Cyprus, the pro-fascist National Front which, the press says, operates with the encouragement of the Greek and US secret services, engineered an attempt on the life of President Makarios. The Iraqi authorities arrested a group of army officers and civilians charged with preparing a coup d'état. The press says they had the assistance of CIA and Zionist agents.

Each of these attempted coups had its own distinctive features. But all of them had one and the same political aim—to install pro-imperialist regimes and thereby strengthen the imperialist positions in the Middle East and, more specifically, in the Eastern Mediterranean.

That aim, doubtlessly, follows from the alignment of forces in this strategic area. The imperialists banked on the Israeli *Blitzkrieg*. They thought it would write *finis* to the progressive regimes in the United Arab Republic and Syria. That hope did not materialise. Nor have Israel's subsequent aggressive actions produced the desired results. They have not weakened the progressive regimes of these two countries. On the contrary, both in the UAR and Syria the government has been strengthened by the patriotism of the people, the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and the support of the world Communist, workers' and national liberation movements.

While giving the Israeli aggressors every assistance—modern armaments, generous loans—the US and other imperialists are relying more and more on their espionage and subversion machine. The events in Iraq, Sudan and Lebanon show that they are using it to hamper the growing unity of the Arab states in the fight to liquidate the consequences of the Israeli aggression. The idea, obviously, is to generate more friction, distrust and antagonism. That was the purpose of the CIA in Lebanon: armed conflicts were to provoke a major political crisis that would isolate the country from the progressive Arab states, place it under a police regime and impede, if not halt altogether, Palestinian commando action.

The aim was very much the same in Iraq and Sudan. But the imperialists were also out to undermine the rear areas of the Arab states directly confronting Israel. Coups in Baghdad and Khartoum would greatly complicate the UAR's and Syria's strategic and political position. To a certain extent the same aim was pursued in the Nicosia plot. There have been many press reports that the imperialists are anxious to overthrow the Makarios government and turn it into a NATO war base spearheaded against the Arab states and serving the Israeli aggressor.

Behind the Cambodian Coup

Thousands of kilometers separate Phnom Penh from Khartoum and Beirut, but in Cambodia too, the aim was to support the aggressive forces. It was to be achieved by use of the CIA technique.

Bogged down in Vietnam, US imperialism has long been encroaching on Cambodia's independence and sovereignty, trying to bring it under its influence and drag it into its Indochina gamble. One pressure technique was constant harassment by US forces operating from neighbouring South Vietnam. They bombed and shelled Cambodian border regions and several times CIA agents tried to overthrow Prince Sihanouk and set up a reactionary regime that would abandon the country's traditional neutrality and its solidarity with the Vietnamese in their fight to repel the aggressor.

With the US army facing increasing difficulties in Vietnam, the Pentagon decided to step up its activities in Cambodia. The plan, according to press reports, was to use Cambodian territory for operations against the South Vietnam National Liberation Front in what was conceived as a gigantic pincer manoeuvre. Apparently, the US military command began to press for action in Cambodia when it found that the Vietnamisation plan was not working out the way it had expected. And apparently Sihanouk's diplomatic tour abroad was chosen as the opportune moment for the CIA's "quiet Americans" to put through the plan.

Power in Phnom Penh is now in the hands of men who have joined forces with the imperialists to halt the country's progressive development and suppress the Indochina liberation movement. The first steps in that direction were made immediately after the coup. General Lon Nol's conservative regime has agreed to co-operate with the US and accept military "aid" from it. With the consent and approval of that regime, Saigon forces, supported by American aircraft, have invaded Cambodia in an attempt to outflank the NLF forces and suppress popular support for Prince Sihanouk, whose followers are fighting to overthrow the conservative government and keep Cambodia a peaceful and neutral state.

The world was shocked by the news of America's outright intervention in Cambodia where, as in South Vietnam and Laos, US troops are applying scorched earth tactics against the peaceful population. This fresh aggression by Washington brings out even more saliently the link between the coup d'état in Phnom Penh and imperialism's far-reaching neo-colonialist plans in South east Asia. To all practical purposes, Cambodia is being turned into a "third Vietnam", the second being Laos, where more than 12,000 American military "advisors" are involved in the war against the patriotic forces.

It can be safely said that neither the Saigon puppets nor the Laos and Cambodian reactionaries provide America with anything like a firm support base for its reactionary war in Indochina. And certainly they cannot fight that war with their own armies, even if given the latest American weapons. Consequently, the neo-colonialists will have to rely mainly on their own troops and extend their operations to the whole of Indochina. But the experience of heroic Vietnam has shown that half a million interventionist troops, armed to the teeth, cannot impose imperialism's will on a people determined to uphold its independence, sovereignty and freedom; a people, moreover, that enjoys wide international support.

New tactical elements

Has anything substantially new been added to the technology of imperialist plots and their political orientation, compared with the information—the bulk of it, naturally, is kept secret—for a categorical affirmative answer. We can only judge by the tip of the imperialist subversion ice-

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CIA's secret role in the secret war

By MICHAEL KRAFT
Reuters News Service

WASHINGTON — Congressional critics of American involvement in Laos are showing increasing interest in the part being played by the Central Intelligence Agency and what they consider the unusual role of the U.S. ambassador.

According to Sen. Stuart Symington, (D., Mo.) Ambassador McMurtrie Godley operates in Vientiane, the Laotian capital, as a sort of pro-consul, directing American military and intelligence activities in addition to his normal diplomatic functions.

Sen. William Fulbright (D., Ark.) zeroed in on a press report that the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) in Laos is a cover for C.I.A. men, declaring that if true "it is another sign that we are in over our heads."

Though President Nixon has adopted a new policy of frank disclosure of all casualties and air losses in Laos and has given a 4,000-word explanation of American policy, he has never mentioned the super-secret C.I.A.

But Laos has been known for years as an "agency country," and C.I.A. men are suspected of accounting for a large proportion of the 643 Americans acknowledged by Nixon to be engaged in a military advisory and logistical support role.

The U.S. operation in Laos is directed by two men who supervised a similar U.S. support program in the Congo in the 1960's.

Godley, now 52, was ambassador in the Congo from 1964 to 1966, a time when the U.S. was providing equipment and tactical air support for the central Congolese government's campaign against the leftist Simba rebels.

The C.I.A. operations in the Congo were directed by Lawrence Devlin, now a political officer in the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane but described in official documents as the chief of the C.I.A. mission.

The Congolese air force was supplied with reconditioned U.S. twin-engine B-26 bombers and single-engine T-28s that were flown by Cuban and East European exiles against the rebels in the eastern

Mauldin
Congo. Correspondents who were there at the time say the C.I.A.'s role was an open secret.

The American assistance was regarded as an important factor in helping the Congo government suppress the rebellion, with the help of white mercenary soldiers.

In response to congressional inquiries, the Nixon Administration has asserted that it is merely a coincidence that both Godley and Devlin are now assigned to Laos.

Godley was assailed on the Senate floor recently by Symington, one of the most vocal critics of both the Laotian involvement and the administration secrecy about it.

Symington has been rebuffed by the State Department in his demand for the ambassador's immediate recall to testify before Congress.

Fulbright also wants to bring the ambassador home and sent a letter to the State Department backing the recall demand.

Press reports have said there are hundreds of C.I.A. agents in Laos, and Fulbright told a reporter he thought the agency's operations there were costing between \$200 million and \$300 million a year.

Silver fleets of aircraft on charter to the C.I.A. are said to have been providing tactical support for years to Gen. Van Pao's pro-government force of Meo tribesmen.

Three Air America employees were among six civilian fatalities acknowledged by the State Department to have occurred in Laos in the past year.

One of the victims, J. C. Merkel, was killed by a bullet when piloting a helicopter over the Plain of Jars last month — during the Communist offensive that recaptured the strategic area.

According to press accounts cited by members of the Senate, Green Berets and other army veterans now technically civilians have been operating under contract to the C.I.A. in Laos.

The agency is also alleged to have financed air operations, including transportation, and some tactical support for the pro-government neutralist forces against the Communists.

Single-engine Laotian T-28 fighters are serviced by American mechanics, although the combat flying has been done by Laotians and other non-Americans, the reports say.



De-escalation

STATINTL

The ousting of Prince Sihanouk had all the hallmarks of the C.I.A. at its best

AFTER several years of waiting in the shadows, America's Central Intelligence Agency may be fully operational again.

This week's incredible coup in Cambodia, which will have such far-reaching consequences through the entire Asian theatre, had the stamp of the C.I.A. at its most professional.

Of course, there will be no official detail on the C.I.A. role, but it would be naive in today's world to assume that Prince Norodom Sihanouk's overthrow was just a lucky accident for the United States.


Way back in 1966, the agency was accused by some watchdog American Senators of supporting Cambodian rebels who opposed the Prince — an accusation that was widely trumpeted about South-East Asia, where the C.I.A. is credited with having spies in every town and in every Government.

It probably does.

While the super-spy agency has made grotesque mistakes over the past 10 years, it has also scored some brilliant successes and, under the enthusiastic support of President Nixon, C.I.A. director Richard Helms and his world-wide network of spies are doubtless more powerful than ever.

Charges that they had meddled far too much in Asian politics caused the C.I.A. men to lie low for some time, but it was obvious even to a reporter on a brief visit to South-East Asia this month that the C.I.A. was "gung-ho" again.

Transport and passenger planes of Air America Inc., which is run as a C.I.A. subsidiary, are to be seen in Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam, and it is common knowledge that these aircraft are used to move agents and weapons for secret projects.



C.I.A. chief Richard Helms . . . more powerful than ever

THE SPOOKS ARE BACK IN BUSINESS IN ASIA

From PETER
MICHELMORE
in New York

STATINTL

Observations. Chalk up another one for the CIA. The former French Congo now has a Communist regime thanks to the CIA's sponsorship of the military junta that just proclaimed the Congo a communist republic, complete with a red flag and the "Internationale" as a national anthem. ✓

Russell Warren Howe: "Very Optimistic"

Africa For the Africans by G. Mennen Williams

(Eerdmans; \$5.95)

In his first major appointment after taking office, JFK selected G. Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Williams had hoped for cabinet rank—at HEW. In compensation, he was allowed to build African Affairs into a proto-ministry.

The section had been carved out, for administrative reasons only, a few years earlier. After "Soapy," the post reverted to its former obscurity. Williams, a six-times Michigan governor, put his office on the map: probably not one American in one thousand could name the present incumbent.

It is from this emeritus status that Williams writes of his African experience and his views on African policy (if Washington has an African policy now, it's a closely guarded secret). There is a measure of real naïveté in this bluff New Frontiersman with the baseball coach manner. He stoutly avers that the one-party state in Africa is not fascistic, but does not elaborate beyond joining with the paternalists to praise intra-party discussion and declare that "administration has by and large been in the public interest." (Mussolini deserves similar praise, for what it's worth.) Yet he senses the flavor of "American frontier life" in parts of Africa, and says convincingly: "Perhaps the one-party system in Africa is a short-term, transitional arrangement. We Americans ought to remember that George Washington was not confronted by an opposition party."

He is at his best in his memoirs of recent African history. On the Congo he is excellent. He writes accurately that "neither I nor any other State Department official had any warning that (President) Kasa-Vubu would make such a selection" (Tshombe as premier in 1964). "No American encouraged Tshombe's return." Indeed, he rightly emphasizes how uneasy the initial relationship was between the US Em-

bassy and the new premier. He records Tshombe's qualities in his newly found legitimacy: his courageous and successful barnstorming, his authority and—when the spirit moved him—efficiency. He notes that Tshombe only raised his white foreign legion after efforts to get an African peace force failed. A passionate Africanophile, Williams has the courage to call the Stanleyville paratroop rescue mission humanitarian and to brand as racist those who opposed it.

Curiously he believes that in all the Congolese crises, "the US never intended to commit American forces to combat in the Congo." Leaving aside Col. Dodds and his front line colleagues as "advisors," and the CIA civilians who flew the Grummans, there was the important commitment, obtained by Ambassador Edmund Gullion from President Kennedy, to put US pursuit aircraft into action in Katanga, in January 1963, under the UN flag, if the last UN push against the rebels looked like foundering.

He makes a number of minor slips mostly dating from the Eisenhower era, but he sensitively sums up the Congolese dilemma: a people finding it hard to understand why their country, the richest in Africa, could not, once independent, offer the standard of living of Belgian colonists. He is too tactful, however, to give the reason: Congolese productivity is infinitely lower.

Outside of the Congo, Williams devotes the bulk of his effort to appraisals of white policy in Southern Africa. He notes that Africans have "lost a great deal of confidence in Great Britain" because of the flabby handling of white Rhodesia; and he asserts that if direct action is not taken it "gives the lie to British and American expressions of opposition to racialism." But having

vice is to duck behind British responsibility. And in South Africa itself he is invariably more concerned with humoring the aggressor than seeing the problem squarely from the victim's view. He notes that two million Euraficans ("Coloreds") are "in language, religion and way of life indistinguishable from the whites, except for the poverty, inferior education and traditional social ills of a depressed group." And so he proposes that whites should begin by "accepting" Euraficans:

What must be secured is a transition without violence to a condition that will assure rights for those now deprived as well as for those presently enjoying a privileged position.

Yet he provides no strategy for transition, and rejects such unviolent solutions as territorial partition, the cutting off of investment, or navally enforced sanctions, since the situation is "not a present threat to peace." He goes on:

We do not believe it appropriate for the United States to try to impose any specific formula, nor do we think it is a practical possibility for us to do so. We will support any reasonable formula agreed upon by a majority of the South African people.

Admittedly the atmosphere was different, but the US managed to impose democracy on Japan, a less fascistic and more important country than South Africa. And how is a South African majority even to emerge, let alone agree, without some sort of revolution?

US policy must steer an imaginative but practical, determined but sensitive course.

Yet:
The situation has engendered a

continued